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FOR WHOM THE STATUTE TOLLS: AMERICAN 
PIPE TOLLING AND STATUTES OF REPOSE IN 
SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS 
Catalina Ford* 
“Statutes of limitation, which are found and approved in all systems 
of enlightened jurisprudence, represent a pervasive legislative 
judgment that it is unjust to fail to put the adversary on notice to 
defend within a specified period of time and that the right to be free 
of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute 
them.”1 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate entities are typically organized under two systems: 
concentrated ownership and dispersed ownership. 2   The American 
economic landscape is dominated by firms operating under dispersed 
ownership systems.3  In typical dispersed ownership entities, ownership 
and control are separate. 4   No single shareholder, or group of 
shareholders, owns a majority of the firm’s shares, enabling them to 
influence board actions.5  Consequently, dispersed ownership systems 
are plagued by the collective action problem.6  It is difficult for various 
shareholders, even institutional investors, to efficiently organize and 
coalesce their votes.7  Since the interests of shareholders and the board 
may differ, the implicit separation of ownership and control in a 
dispersed ownership system fosters concerns for minority shareholders’ 
rights.8 
																																																																																																																																
 2. See John C. Coffee Jr., Dispersed Ownership: The Theories, the Evidence, and 
the Enduring Tension Between “Lumpers” and “Splitters” 2 (European Corporate 
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 144, 2010) [hereinafter Coffee, Lumpers and 
Splitters], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1532922. 
 3. In 2001, less than 3% of American companies exemplified a concentrated 
ownership system. See id. at 2, n.1 (citing Marco Becht & Colin Mayer, Introduction to 
THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE EUROPE (Fabrizio Barca and Marco Brecht eds.) (2001)); 
see also Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Toward a Just Measure of 
Repose: The Statute of Limitations for Securities Fraud, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1547, 
1554 (2011) [hereinafter Kaufman & Wunderlich, Just Measure of Repose] (advocating 
for the abolishment of the discovery provision in the statute of limitations but 
maintaining the statute of repose in securities class actions). 
 4. Coffee, Lumpers and Splitters, supra note 2, at 2 (“[T]here is instead a 
‘separation of ownership and control’ with neither the directors nor the senior 
executives typically holding significant blocks of the company’s stock and with share 
ownership instead being dispersed among many institutional and retail shareholders.” 
(citing ADOLF A. BERLE AND GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932)). 
 5. See id.; see also Kaufman & Wunderlich, Just Measure of Repose, supra note 
3, at 1554. 
 6. When shareholders are dispersed, “collective action problems undermine 
shareholder incentives to become informed before voting . . . . Each shareholder will 
know that if she expends the cost of making a better-informed vote, her vote will have 
little impact on the outcome, so she might as well remain uninformed and save the 
information costs.” Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 
80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 796 (2005). 
 7. See Coffee, Lumpers and Splitters, supra note 2, at 61–62. 
 8. See id. at 2–3; Marina Martynova & Luc Renneboog, A Corporate Governance 
Index: Convergence and Diversity of National Corporate Governance Regulations 4 
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Securities reform in the 1930s converted the securities industry 
from a system of caveat emptor to one of caveat vendor. 9   These 
legislative measures ensured that minority shareholder rights were not 
trampled upon and attempted to bridge the gap between ownership and 
control in dispersed ownership systems.10  Passed in the wake of the 
stock market crash of 1929, the Securities Act of 1933 (the “1933 Act”) 
and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”) 
(collectively the “Securities Acts”) aimed to cure deficiencies in 
common law fraud practices by establishing higher standards of conduct 
in the securities industry.11  The 1933 Act regulates the initial offering of 
registered shares, while the 1934 Act regulates the secondary market.12  
The 1934 Act provided for the creation of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) to protect investors.13  The SEC has the power to 
register, regulate, and oversee brokerage firms, transfer agents, clearing 
agencies, and oversee the nation’s securities self regulatory 
																																																																																																																																
(Tilburg Law & Econs. Center, Discussion Paper DP 2010-012), available at 
http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/research/institutes-and-
researchgroups/tilec/research/publications/Discussion-papers-1/2010/. 
 9. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 1 (Kris Markarian eds., 
3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW]. 
 10. For example, in 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission took steps to 
enhance the information companies provide to their shareholders by requiring that 
public companies registered under federal securities law make new or revised 
disclosures to shareholders regarding director qualifications and skills, board leadership 
structure and responsibilities, the board’s role in risk management, and diversity in the 
director nomination process. See Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner, SEC, Shareholders 
Need Robust Disclosure to Exercise Their Voting Rights as Investors and Owners (Feb. 
20, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/ 
1365171492322#.Uu_EB5EeXeI; see also Martynova & Renneboog, supra note 8, at 7 
(“In countries where widely-held companies prevail, the main function of corporate 
governance regulation is to protect shareholders from being expropriated by the 
management.”). 
 11. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012); Herman 
& Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of 
Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership 
and Control, 111 YALE L. J. 1, 80 (2001) (“[A]s liquid securities markets developed and 
dispersed ownership became prevalent, a new political constituency developed that 
desired legal rules capable of filling in the inevitable enforcement gaps that self-
regulation left.”). 
 12. JESSE H. CHOPER, JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., RONALD J. GILSON, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 301–02 (7th ed. 2008). 
 13. 15 U.S.C. § 78d. 
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organizations for the sake of protecting investors, while maintaining a 
fair and efficient market and facilitating capital formation.14 
The Securities Acts also authorize a private right of action.15  Given 
the dispersed ownership nature of most public corporations, class 
actions are the most practical method for shareholders to bring securities 
fraud claims.16  In fact, securities class actions are the largest category of 
class actions17 and may be more effective at deterring and penalizing 
securities law violations than SEC enforcement measures.18 
Although effective, securities class actions have become highly 
regulated and procedurally onerous.19  Class certification is one of the 
																																																																																																																																
 14. See generally The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, 
Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, Securities & Exchange 
Commission, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Apr. 18, 2014). 
 15. In the Securities Act of 1933, Sections 11, 12(a)(1), 12(a)(2), and 15 provide 
for private rights of action, whereas the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 provides 
for a private right of action in Section 18. See JAMES M. BARTOS, UNITED STATES 
SECURITIES LAW: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 182–83 (2d ed. 2002). 
 16. See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“The 
aggregation of individual claims in the context of a classwide suit is an evolutionary 
response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of 
government. Where it is not economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional 
framework of a multiplicity of small individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons 
may be without any effective redress unless they may employ the class-action device.”); 
see also HOWARD M. FRIEDMAN, PUBLICLY HELD CORPORATIONS: A LAWYER’S GUIDE 
82 (2011). 
 17. Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The Unjustified Judicial Creation 
of Class Certification Merits Trials in Securities Fraud Actions, 43 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 323, 324 (2010) [hereinafter Kaufman & Wunderlich, Class Certification 
Merits Trials]. 
 18. See Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, SEC Investigations and Securities 
Class Actions: An Empirical Comparison 28–39 (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ. 
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12-002, 2014), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2109739 (performing a regression analysis and finding that 
SEC investigations may be less likely to have a deterrent effect than securities class 
actions because class actions have a higher incidence and magnitude of settlements and 
top officer resignation than do SEC investigations); see also Kaufman & Wunderlich, 
Class Certification Merits Trials, supra note 17, at 323–24. 
 19. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, passed by Congress in 1995, 
requires qualification of lead plaintiffs, heightened pleading standards, and sanctions 
for abusive litigation in federal securities class actions. See Nicholas I. Porritt, Current 
Trends in Securities Litigation: How Companies and Counsel Should Respond, in 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIES LAW 77, 82–83 (Michaela Falls ed. 2010).  In 
addition to PSLRA’s increased burdens, federal courts have begun to treat a motion for 
class certification into a mini-trial where plaintiffs are required to prove the merits of 
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first procedural obstacles to commencing a class action and can often 
make or break a case.20  Since the adoption of Rule 23 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, federal case law has substantially increased 
the burdens putative classes must meet to have the class certified.21  In 
the event that certification is denied, individual plaintiffs may file 
individual claims or attempt to intervene as lead plaintiff to gain 
certification. 22   Once certification is denied, however, statutes of 
limitations resume running.23 
In American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, the Supreme Court 
held that statutes of limitations toll while a class seeks certification.24  
The decision highlighted Rule 23’s interest in preventing multiple 
individual suits where class action would be a fair and more efficient 
alternative for adjudication.25  The Court has not extended American 
Pipe tolling to statutes of repose, however, and the two circuit courts 
that have considered the issue have come to different conclusions.26  In 
2000, the Tenth Circuit held that the three-year statute of repose in 
Section 13 of the 1933 Act tolls during the class certification process in 
																																																																																																																																
the case. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, Class Certification Merits Trials, supra note 17, 
at 330–43. 
 20. Dwight J. Davis et. al, Expert Opinion in Class Certifications: Second Circuit 
Revisits, Disavows In Re Visa Check and Joins Majority Rule, 74 DEF. COUNS. J. 253, 
253 (2007) (“Once a case is certified, an overwhelming majority of the cases go on to 
settlements, many with large monetary recoveries. On the other hand, those cases that 
do not survive class certification are typically dismissed . . . .”). 
 21. See generally Robert H. Klonoff, F. Hodge O’Neal Corporate and Securities 
Law Symposium: The Future of Class Actions: The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 729 (2013). 
 22. See Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353–54 (1983). 
 23. See id. at 354. 
 24. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974). 
 25. Id. at 551 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (b)(3)). 
 26. Compare Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that the 
three-year statute of repose in securities class action suits toll during the class 
certification process), with Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of City of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, 
Inc., 721 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that for securities class action suits, the three-
year statute of repose does not toll during the certification of the class).  On November 
22, 2013, an investor in IndyMac MBS, Inc. filed a petition for a writ of certiorari 
asking the United States Supreme Court to decide whether the statute of repose 
governing securities law claims is tolled while class-action proceedings are pending. 
IndyMac Investor Asks Supreme Court to Review Tolling of Statute of Repose, 20 No.4 
WESTLAW J. DERIVATIVES 7, at *1 (Jan. 17, 2014). 
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securities class actions. 27   This past summer, however, the Second 
Circuit held that the three-year statute of repose in Section 13 does not 
toll during class certification for securities class actions.28  This Note 
analyzes the current circuit split and suggests a resolution to prevent 
procedural mechanisms from precluding otherwise viable claims. 
Part I of this Note provides a general overview of the procedural 
mechanisms at issue: statutes of limitations, statutes of repose, and class 
actions, while highlighting factors specific to claims made pursuant to 
the Securities Acts.  Part II then examines the circuit courts’ 
interpretation of American Pipe tolling and its application to Section 
13’s statute of repose during class certification, while highlighting ways 
in which lower courts have developed the doctrine. Lastly, Part III 
concurs with the Second Circuit and argues that the statute of repose 
should not toll while a class awaits certification, but relies on a different 
rationale.  This Note argues that simply interpreting the language of 
Section 13 of the 1933 Act and Section 804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
is sufficient to show that Congress did not intend for the statutes of 
repose to be extended.  To prevent process from overriding substance, 
however, this Note advocates for legislative action creating an exception 
to the statutes of repose in Section 13 and Section 804, allowing the 
statute of repose to toll exclusively during class certification for 
securities fraud class actions commenced within the statute of 
limitations. 
I. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS, STATUTES OF REPOSE, AND CLASS 
ACTIONS 
Although distinct, statutes of repose and statutes of limitations are 
often confused.29  Both Congress and the courts have compounded this 
confusion by referring to the statute of repose as a statute of 
limitations.30  Section A discusses statutes of limitations and repose, 
while Section B addresses class actions and provides an overview of 
class action adjudication in securities fraud claims. 
																																																																																																																																
 27. Joseph, 223 F.3d at 1168. 
 28. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d at 112–13. 
 29. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. UBS Ams. Inc., 712 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(citing Massachusetts v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 597 F.3d 84, 88 
(2d Cir. 2010)). 
 30. See id. at 143 nn.3–4. 
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A. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS AND REPOSE 
Sub-section 1 discusses statutes of limitations and the federal 
equitable tolling doctrine, while Sub-section 2 focuses on statutes of 
repose.  In Sub-section 3, this Note compares and contrasts statutes of 
limitations and repose, while Sub-section 4 looks at the public policy 
justifications for limitation periods.  Sub-section 5 discusses the statutes 
of limitations and repose specific to securities fraud claims. 
1. Statutes of Limitations and Equitable Tolling 
Statutes of limitations do not destroy a plaintiff’s right.31  They 
simply withhold the remedy. 32   Failure to bring a claim within the 
limitations period creates a legal presumption that the plaintiff has no 
legal rights.33  Courts, however, can exercise their discretion and toll 
statutes of limitations, allowing plaintiffs to pursue untimely claims.34  
The federal equitable tolling doctrine may be invoked where the federal 
cause of action is based on fraud, where the federal causes of action 
have been concealed by the tortfeasor, and in cases where the plaintiff 
was induced not to take legal action based on the defendant’s 
statements.35  If applicable, the federal equitable tolling doctrine tolls the 
applicable limitations period until the plaintiff discovers, or would have 
discovered with due diligence, the fraud or the fraudulent concealment.36  
																																																																																																																																
 31. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 725–26 (1988) (citing Little v. Blunt, 
26 Mass. 488, 492 (1830)). 
 32. See id. 
 33. See Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 
348–49 (1944) (“The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the 
adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free 
of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.”).  United 
States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290, 299–300 (1922). 
 34. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 221 (1990) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“[W]hen none of the reasons on which the statute is founded can possibly 
apply, the federal courts have exercised equitable discretion to suspend the running of a 
limitations period in conformity with the policy underlying the statute of limitations.”) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. 
Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 557–59 (1974) (citing Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 
424 (1965)); LeCroy v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 585 F.Supp. 753, 758 (E.D. Ark. 
1984). 
 35. See LeCroy, 585 F.Supp. at 758 n.1. 
 36. See id. at 758. 
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While application of the equitable tolling doctrine must be applied on a 
case-by-case basis after a thorough factual analysis, courts uniformly 
apply the doctrine to toll the one-year statute of limitations in Section 13 
of the 1933 Act.37 
2. Statutes of Repose 
In contrast, statutes of repose demarcate a period in which a 
plaintiff must place a defendant on notice of his or her claim, regardless 
of whether the plaintiff himself is aware that he has suffered an injury.38 
Once the specified time period has passed, statutes of repose completely 
extinguish a cause of action.39  Hence, equitable tolling principles are 
inconsistent with statutes of repose.40 
3. The Practical Difference Between Statutes of Limitations and Repose 
While statutes of limitations and repose both limit the time a 
plaintiff has to bring their claims, statutes of limitations and repose have 
different lengths and accrue at different times. 41   In cases alleging 
securities fraud claims, the Supreme Court has held that the statue of 
limitations does not begin running until the fraud is discovered or could 
have been discovered with due diligence.42  Statutes of repose, however, 
are generally longer and run from the date of the alleged wrongdoing.43  
Consequently, the statute of repose may prevent a plaintiff’s claim 
																																																																																																																																
 37. Id. (“Unquestionably, the equitable tolling doctrine applies in the context of 
statutes of limitations under the federal securities laws.”). 
 38. See Arivella v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 164, 177 (D. Mass. 2009). 
 39. Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of City of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 95, 
106 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Massachusetts v. Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
597 F.3d 84, 88 n.4. (2d Cir. 2010)). 
 40. IndyMac MBS, 721 F.3d at 106 (“[S]tatutes of repose affect the underlying 
right, not just the remedy, and thus they run without interruption once the necessary 
triggering event has occurred, even if equitable considerations would warrant tolling . . . 
.”) (citations omitted). 
 41. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, Just Measure of Repose, supra note 3, at 1558. 
 42. See Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 653 (2010) (“The limitations 
period . . . begins to run once the plaintiff did discover or a reasonably diligent plaintiff 
would have discovered the facts constituting the violation—whichever comes first.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 43. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 361 
(1991) (holding that a uniform federal statutory time bar to federal security fraud claims 
was preferable to the states applying their own limitations periods). 
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before she even realizes that a cause of action exists.44  In such cases, the 
statute of repose prevents what otherwise could have been a cause of 
action from ever manifesting.45  Thus, a defendant who can successfully 
conceal his fraudulent actions until the statute of repose runs can 
completely escape liability and leave injured parties with no legal 
recourse. 
4. Policy Justifications for Limitation Periods. 
Statutory time bars aim to strike a balance between the competing 
fundamental values of repose for defendants and vindication of the 
plaintiff’s underlying claim.46  Both statutes of limitations and statutes 
of repose function to bar stale claims. 47   The stale claim rationale 
encourages plaintiffs to file their claims in a timely manner so that 
defendants are not unduly burdened with presenting a defense with stale 
evidence.48  Thus, a plaintiff may not idly sit on their rights.  Rather, a 
plaintiff must perform due diligence and investigate whether they have a 
viable cause of action before the applicable time bar runs out. Statutory 
time bars can also promote judicial efficiency by clearing dockets of 
stale claims and freeing scarce judicial resources.49 
																																																																																																																																
 44. See P. Stolz Family P’ship v. Daum, 355 F.3d 92, 102–03 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 45. Id. at 103 (citing Rosenberg v. North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 199 (1972)). 
 46. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 726 (1988). 
 47. Arivella v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 164, 174 (D. Mass. 2008) 
(“Statutes of limitations serve to ‘ensure essential fairness to defendants and to bar a 
plaintiff who has slept on his rights.’”) (quoting Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 
U.S. 538, 554–55 (1974) (alterations omitted)); see also Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 
55, 62 (1902) (“Every government . . . is not bound to keep its courts open indefinitely 
for one who neglects or refuses to apply for redress until it may fairly be presumed that 
the means by which the other party might disprove his claim are lost in the lapse of 
time.”) (quoting THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS 44 (2011)). 
 48. Kaufman & Wunderlich, Just Measure of Repose, supra note 3, at 1551 n.3 
(“The stale evidence rationale is rooted in the premise that resolving claims on their 
merits is more likely if the evidence, including testimony based on recall, is produced 
closer in time to the event that gives rise to the claim.”); see also John R. Sand & 
Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133 (2008) (“Most statutes of limitations 
seek primarily to protect defendants against stale or unduly delayed claims.”); Order of 
R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1944). 
 49. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, Just Measure of Repose, supra note 3, at 1551 n.3 
(“The. . . statute of limitations promotes judicial efficiency and conservation of judicial 
resources, [and] safeguards the accuracy of . . . judgments by requiring resolution . . . 
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While statutes of repose appear to be harsh arbitrary cut-offs 
incentivizing defendants to conceal their violations, they represent a 
legislative compromise balancing various interests. 50   Legislatures at 
both the state and federal level have implemented statutes of repose to 
limit a defendant’s liability in furtherance of economic goals, such as 
keeping insurance premiums down and limiting the perpetual liability of 
manufacturers.51  Limitation periods concerned with keeping insurance 
premium costs low seek to redress the increasing costs for medical 
malpractice insurance and the reluctance of insurance underwriters to 
underwrite medical professionals and ultimately are motivated by an 
interest in increasing the availability of quality health care options.52  
Alternatively, limiting manufacturer liability can increase the 
availability of affordable product liability insurance and thereby lower 
the price consumers’ pay for products.53  A possible justification for 
statutes of repose in securities law is the economic effect of reduced 
litigation costs for corporations. Litigation costs are ultimately passed 
down to the shareholders in the form of decreased stock values or 
decreased dividends.54  Thus, while statutes of repose might preclude 
some shareholders from adjudicating their otherwise viable securities 
fraud claims, they may protect shareholders’ economic interests by 
reducing the potential costs imposed on their investments. 
5. Statutes of Limitations and Repose in Securities Law 
The majority of claims in securities class actions are brought 
pursuant to Rule 10b-555 and Section 10(b)56 of the 1934 Act.57  While 
																																																																																																																																
while the record is fresh.”) (quoting Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205–06 
(2006)). 
 50. Garris Ference, Statutes of Repose and the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. 10888, 10894 
(2006) (“[L]imiting the time within which actions may be brought has in numerous 
cases been held to be a rational, nonarbitrary means of achieving economic ends.”) 
(quoting Wayne v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 730 F.2d 392, 403 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
 51. See id.; see also Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 631 F. Supp. 
1144, 1151 (S.D. Fla. 1986). 
 52. See Ference, supra note 50, at 10894. 
 53. See Spence v. Miles Lab., 810 F. Supp. 952, 963 (E.D. Tenn. 1992). 
 54. Kaufman & Wunderlich, Just Measure of Repose, supra note 3, at 1606 
(“[S]cholars suggest that the costs of securities class actions—both the settlement and 
the litigation expenses of both sides—fall largely on the defendant corporation, and so 
its shareholders ultimately bear these costs indirectly.”). 
 55.  
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Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5 do not specify limitation periods within 
which claims must be brought, the Supreme Court has held that the 
limitation periods in Section 13 of the 1933 Act58 extend to claims made 
																																																																																																																																
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use 
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the 
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To 
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any 
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) 
To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013). 
 56.  
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use 
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the 
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange . . . (b) 
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security 
not so registered, or any securities-based swap agreement any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of 
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors. 
Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012). 
 57. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILING: 2012 YEAR IN 
REVIEW 1 (2013) (“In 2012, 85 percent of filings made Rule 10b-5 claims, whereas only 
10 percent and 9 percent made Section 11 or Section 12(2) claims, respectively.”), 
available at http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/2012_YIR/ 
Cornerstone_Research_Securities_Class_Action_Filings_2012_YIR.pdf. 
 58.  
No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under 
section 11 or section 12(a)(2) . . . unless brought within one year 
after the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after 
such discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, or, if the action is to enforce a liability created under 
section 12(a)(1) . . ., unless brought within one year after the 
violation upon which it is based. In no event shall any such action be 
brought to enforce a liability created under section 11 or section 
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pursuant to Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5 under the 1934 Act, in 
addition to claims arising under sections already specified in the 1933 
Act, Sections 11, 12(a)(1), and 12(a)(2).59  The limitation periods in 
Section 13 have been described as “a statute of limitations framed by a 
statute of repose.”60  They are “cumulative, not alternative.”61  Thus, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate that their cause of action was filed within a 
year of discovering the untrue statement or omission—or a year after 
they should have discovered the mistake through due diligence—and 
within three years after the security at issue was bona fide offered to the 
public.62 
On July 30, 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the “Sarbanes-
Oxley Act”) was enacted. 63   The Sarbanes-Oxley Act effectively 
extended time bars on private rights of action that involve “a claim of 
fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance in contravention of a 
regulatory requirement concerning the securities laws.”64  According to 
Section 804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the enumerated claims must be 
brought either within two years after the discovery of the facts 
constituting the violation, or five years after the violation took place.65  
																																																																																																																																
12(a)(1) . . . more than three years after the security was bona fide 
offered to the public, or under section 12(a)(2) . . . more than three 
years after the sale. 
Section 13 of the 1933 Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77m. 
 59. Lampf, Pelva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 359 
(1991). 
 60. Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1166 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Sterlin v. 
Biomune Sys., 154 F.3d 1191, 1196 (10th Cir. 1998)). 
 61. LeCroy v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 753, 760 (E.D. Ark. 1984). 
 62. See id. 
 63. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 
28 U.S.C. §1658(b) (2012)). 
 64.  
[A] private right of action that involves a claim of fraud, deceit, 
manipulation, or contrivance in contravention of a regulatory 
requirement concerning the securities laws, as defined in section 
3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 
78c(a)(47)), may be brought not later than the earlier of – (1) 2 years 
after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation; or (2) 5 
years after such violation. 
28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2012). 
 65. Id. 
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Thus, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act extended the statute of repose from three 
years to five years.”66  However, the statutes of limitation and repose set 
forth in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act cannot be applied retroactively to revive 
claims extinguished prior to the Act’s effective date of July 30, 2002.67 
Thus, a plaintiff asserting a claim pursuant to Section 10 under the 
1934 Act or Sections 11, 12(a)(1), or 12(a)(2) under the 1933 Act must 
file suit within a year of when they discover, or should have discovered, 
the violation, but if the cause of action accrued after July 30, 2002, they 
have two years under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.68  If the plaintiff does not 
file suit within three years – or five years if the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
applies – after the initial public offering or sale, the statute of repose 
then bars their claims.69  Class actions, however, present a dilemma.  If 
an individual is a plaintiff, named or unnamed, in a class action filed 
within the applicable statutes of limitations and repose, and class 
certification is denied, then the individual’s subsequent efforts to 
adjudicate his claims are at risk of being found untimely.70  While the 
Supreme Court has held that statutes of limitations toll until the district 
court’s denial of certification,71 the courts have yet to apply the same 
tolling doctrine to statutes of repose.72  Thus, a plaintiff’s subsequent 
																																																																																																																																
 66. Compare id., with Lampf, Pelva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 
U.S. 350, 364 n.9 (1991).  Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 applies to claims of 
“fraud, deceit, manipulation or a contrivance in contravention” of the requirements of 
the securities laws, 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b), courts only apply the limitations periods 
therein for claims that require a showing of “scienter and motive to defraud.” See In re 
Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 402, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding that the 
extended limitations periods in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act did not apply to section 18 
claims since they do not require plaintiffs to plead scienter. The court noted a general 
consensus among district courts that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was only applicable to 
claims requiring proof of intent as an element of the claim.). 
 67. Champion v. Homa, No. 3:03-CV-275-MEF, 2008 WL 8837534, at *12 (M.D. 
Ala. Mar. 31, 2008) (citing six other circuits that have held that the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act’s statute of limitations cannot revive stale claims). 
 68. See Lampf, 501 U.S. at 362–64; see also 28 U.S.C. §1658(b). 
 69. See Lampf, 501 U.S. at 362–64; see also 28 U.S.C. §1658(b). 
 70. See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553–54 (1974). 
 71. See id. at 552–54. 
 72. See Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of City of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 
95, 100 (2d Cir. 2013); see also IndyMac Investor Asks Supreme Court to Review 
Tolling of Statute of Repose, 20 NO. 4 WESTLAW J. DERIVATIVES 7, at *1 (Jan. 17, 
2014). 
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efforts may be time barred if they fall outside the three-year/five-year 
statute of repose.73 
B. CLASS ACTIONS 
A federal class action is a legal construct meant to increase judicial 
efficiency by avoiding the separate filing of similar claims.74  Courts 
must determine whether an action may be maintained as a class action as 
soon as practicable after a person sues or is sued as a class 
representative. 75   When determining if a class action is appropriate, 
courts must verify that the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure are met, specifically those outlined in Rule 23.76  Sub-section 
1 outlines the threshold requirements a putative class must meet for 
certification while Sub-section 2 discusses Rule 23(b) requiring that 
class action be preferable to individual action.  Sub-section 3 then 
provides an overview of class action adjudication in securities law. 
1. Rule 23(a): Getting over the Threshold 
Rule 23(a) provides four threshold requirements for class 
certification: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of 
representation. 77   To meet Rule 23(a)’s numerosity requirement the 
number of class members must be so large “that joinder of all members 
is impractical.”78  The requirements of commonality and typicality focus 
on the claims the class members assert.79  While commonality requires 
that all putative class members present “questions of law or fact 
common to the class,” typicality requires that all named class members 
assert claims or defenses typical of the class as a whole.80  Finally, a 
																																																																																																																																
 73. See IndyMac MBS, 721 F.3d at 109. 
 74. “A federal class action is no longer an invitation to joinder but a truly 
representative suit designed to avoid, rather than encourage, unnecessary filing of 
repetitious papers and motions.” Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 550 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 75. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(a). 
 76. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974) (quoting Miller v. 
Mackey Int’l, 452 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1971)). 
 77. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 
(1997). 
 78. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). 
 79. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2)–(3). 
 80. See id. 
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court must find that the named class members “fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class.”81 
2. Rule 23(b): Class Action Is Preferable to Individual Action 
Once Rule 23(a) is satisfied, plaintiffs must demonstrate that class 
action is preferable to individual class members pursuing their claims 
separately.82  Plaintiffs seeking class certification contend that individual 
actions may result in inconsistent adjudications and may establish 
incompatible standards of conduct.83  Alternatively, a court may grant a 
certification order if individual adjudication of the claims at hand 
“would be dispositive of the interests of other members not parties to the 
individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their 
ability to protect their interests.”84  A class action lawsuit may also be 
certified in instances where a defendant “has acted or refused to act on 
grounds that apply generally to the class” or where the court determines 
“that the questions of law or fact common to class members 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.”85 
Since Rule 23(f) was adopted in 1998, parties have been able to 
challenge orders either denying or granting certification. 86  
Consequently, a court of appeals may vacate a district court’s 
certification order, so long as “the petition for permission to appeal is 
filed . . . within 14 days after the order is entered.”87 
3. Class Actions in Securities Law 
In 1994, over 200 securities class actions were filed.88  In an effort 
to reign in securities litigation, Congress enacted the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”) and the Securities Litigation 
																																																																																																																																
 81. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
 82. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b); Amchem, 521 U.S. at 613. 
 83. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A). 
 84. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B). 
 85. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2)–(3). 
 86. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) and advisory committee’s note. 
 87. See id. 
 88. RICHARD PAINTER, MEGAN FARRELL & SCOTT ADKINS, FEDERALIST SOC’Y L. & 
PUB. POL’Y STUD., PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT: A POST-ENRON 
ANALYSIS 3–4 (2002), available at http://fedsoc.server326.com/pdf/ 
PSLRAFINALII.PDF. 
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Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”).89  The PSLRA applies to 
securities claims brought in federal court.90  It added Section 27 of the 
1933 Act and Section 21D of the 1934 Act.91  The PSLRA aimed to 
decrease frivolous securities class actions by requiring qualification of 
the lead plaintiff, limiting attorney’s fees, restricting pre-trial discovery, 
providing sanctions for frivolous lawsuits, and increasing pleading 
requirements so that plaintiffs must allege, with particularity, “facts 
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the 
required state of mind.”92  While the PSLRA was enacted to preclude 
plaintiffs from filing frivolous securities class actions, studies indicate 
that the law did not actually chill litigation.93  At first, PSLRA seemed to 
fulfill Congress’ desired effect.  The number of securities class actions 
filed following PSLRA’s enactment dropped from approximately 191 in 
1995 to approximately 119 in 1996. 94   This trend reversed soon 
thereafter.  In 1997, approximately 174 securities class actions were 
filed.95 
Since the PSLRA governs securities claims in federal court, 
plaintiffs sought to side-step PSLRA’s additional hurdles by filing their 
securities fraud claims in state court. 96   Through SLUSA, Congress 
established a uniform set of procedural and substantive restrictions that 
would govern all securities fraud class action claims.97 SLUSA prevents 
forum shopping by requireing all class action claimants alleging fraud in 
connection with the purchase or sale of securities to file in federal 
court. 98  Plaintiffs that fail to comply with SLUSA risk having their 
claims precluded.99  For example, if a plaintiff files a state-law class 
action alleging misconduct covered by SLUSA in federal court, the 
defendant can move to dismiss the action, and the court must grant the 
																																																																																																																																
 89. See FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW, supra note 9, at 76. 
 90. See id. 
 91. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 83; BARTOS, supra note 15, at 225. 
 92. See BARTOS, supra note 15, at 225. 
 93. See generally PAINTER, FARRELL & ADKINS, supra note 88 (providing a 
statistical analysis of securities class action filings since PSLRA’s enactment). 
 94. Mukesh Bajaj, Sumon C. Mazumdar, & Atulya Sarin, Securities Class Action 
Settlements, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1001, 1003 (2003). 
 95. Federal Securities Class Action Litigation 1996-YTD, STANFORD LAW, 
http://securities.stanford.edu/charts.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2014). 
 96. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 84. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. John M. Wunderlich, “Uniform” Standards for Securities Class Actions, 80 
TENN. L. REV. 167, 168 (2012). 
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motion.100  Alternatively, if a plaintiff files a state-law class action claim 
covered by SLUSA in state court, the defendant may remove the action 
to federal court.101  Once the SLUSA claim is properly in federal court, 
the defendant can move for dismissal and the court must grant the 
motion.102 
II. A REVIEW OF AMERICAN PIPE AND ITS APPLICATION IN THE 
CIRCUIT COURTS 
Part II of this Note reviews American Pipe tolling and explores the 
current circuit split between the Second and Tenth Circuits on whether 
or not American Pipe tolling can apply to the statute of repose in 
securities fraud class action claims.  Section A outlines American Pipe 
& Construction Co. v. Utah103 and discusses the rationale behind the 
court’s holding concerning the tolling doctrine.  Section B outlines 
Joseph v. Wiles,104 a Tenth Circuit case, which held that American Pipe 
tolling applied to the statute of repose in securities fraud class action 
lawsuits.  Section C outlines Police and Fire Retirement Systems of City 
of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc.,105 a Second Circuit case, which held 
that American Pipe tolling could not toll the statute of repose in 
securities fraud class action lawsuits.  This Part concludes with Section 
D, which gives an overview of the implications of the Joseph and 
IndyMac decisions. 
A. AMERICAN PIPE & CONSTRUCTION CO. V. UTAH 
Sub-section 1 describes the facts that gave rise to the American 
Pipe tolling doctrine.  Sub-section 2 discusses the Supreme Court’s 
rationale behind the American Pipe tolling doctrine decision.  Finally, 
Sub-section 3 outlines developments to the American Pipe tolling 
doctrine. 
																																																																																																																																
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Am. Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974). 
 104. Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 95 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 105. Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of City of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 95 
(2d Cir. 2013). 
2014] FOR WHOM THE STATUTE TOLLS 617 
1. Background of the Case 
American Pipe concerned antitrust claims brought by the state of 
Utah on behalf of the public agencies of the state and local government 
who were end-users of pipes sold by defendants, American Pipe & 
Construction Co. (“American Pipe”) and other such distributors.106 On 
March 10, 1964, American Pipe and others were indicted by a federal 
grand jury for violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 107   The 
indictment alleged that the Defendants restrained trade by conspiring to 
fix prices for the sale of steel and concrete pipes at auction and 
distributing the proceeds among the parties.108  The Defendants pled 
nolo contendere to the allegations on June 19, 1964.109  On June 23, the 
United States filed civil complaints in the United States District Court 
for the Central District of California against the same Defendants which 
resulted in a settlement.110 
On May 13, 1969, eleven days before the expiration of the statute 
of limitations, the State of Utah brought civil claims against American 
Pipe in the United States District Court for the District of Utah pursuant 
to Section 1 of the Sherman Act claiming that petitioners conspired to 
illegally fix the prices of concrete and steel pipes.111 Subsequently, the 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation from Utah transferred the suit 
to the United States District Court for the Central District of California 
where the court held that the State did not meet the “numerosity” 
requirement under Rule 23(a)(1) and thus the lawsuit could not be 
maintained as a class action.112  On December 12, 1969, more than 60 
towns, municipalities, and water districts in the State of Utah filed 
motions with the Court to intervene in the State’s action.113  The district 
court denied these motions finding them untimely since the limitations 
period had run. 114   The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
subsequently affirmed the district court’s decision to deny leave to 
intervene as of right, but reversed the district court’s decision to deny 
																																																																																																																																
 106. See Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 540. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 540–41. 
 111. Id. at 542. 
 112. Id. at 542–43. 
 113. Id. at 543–44. 
 114. Id. at 544. 
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permissive intervention. 115   The Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
decide whether limitations periods toll for putative class members once 
a class action has been filed.116 
2. A New Tolling Doctrine Emerges 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and held 
that the commencement of a class action tolls the statute of limitations 
for all timely intervenors.117  The Court emphasized Rule 23’s purpose 
of promoting judicial efficiency and determined that to hold otherwise 
would frustrate that purpose.118  The opinion noted that the statute of 
limitations’ underlying policy of ensuring fairness to defendants was 
preserved with the new tolling doctrine since commencement of the 
initial class suit put defendants on notice of the substantive claims and 
the number and generic identities of potential plaintiffs.119 Although the 
new tolling doctrine expanded the court’s power to toll statutes of 
limitations, the Supreme Court limited its holding to cases in which 
class action status was denied due to a failure to satisfy the Rule 23(a) 
numerosity requirement.120 
3. Developments After American Pipe 
In Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker,121 the Supreme Court held 
that American Pipe tolling extended to all asserted members of the 
putative class and to non-class members who later file their own 
independent actions, not simply intervenors. 122   The Crown Court 
																																																																																																																																
 115. Id. at 544–45. 
 116. Id. at 545. 
 117. Id. at 553. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 555. 
 120. Id. at 552–53. 
 121. 462 U.S. 345 (1983). 
 122. See id. at 352.  However, the Circuit Courts are divided on whether American 
Pipe tolling applies to individuals who commence individual suits before the 
certification issue is resolved in an impending class action. Compare State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Boellstorff, 540 F.3d 1223, 1231 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that 
American Pipe tolling applied to separate suits regardless of when they are filed), with 
Wyser-Pratte Mgmt. Co. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d 553, 568 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(concluding that “a plaintiff who chooses to file an independent action without waiting 
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maintained that Rule 23 encourages class members to remain passive 
and rely on the named plaintiffs to press their claims. 123  Since 
defendants are on notice as to the substantive claims and the number and 
generic identities of potential plaintiffs, tolling the statute of limitations 
for putative class members who do not seek intervention and individuals 
filing independent claims does not create the unfair surprise that a 
statute of limitations seeks to prevent.124  Thus, with respect to securities 
fraud claims, filing a class action tolls the one-year statute of limitations 
period under Section 13 and the two-year period under Section 804 if 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act controls for all putative class members during 
class certification.125 
In American Pipe, the Supreme Court clearly held that the relevant 
statute of limitations tolls while the class awaits certification, however, 
the Court did not specify when tolling would end.126  The Crown Court 
held that tolling ends when class certification is denied.127  Recently, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that in the 
event that a class certification order is vacated, the running of the 
limitations periods resumes.128  Generally, voluntarily dismissed claims 
are treated as though they never existed.129  However, some courts have 
held that when a class action is voluntarily dismissed, American Pipe 
tolling can be invoked when an amended complaint is filed.130 
Although American Pipe tolling has been extended to claims 
outside of the antitrust domain, lower courts have recognized certain 
																																																																																																																																
for a determination on the class certification issue” of an impending class action cannot 
rely on American Pipe tolling). 
 123. Crown, 462 U.S. at 353. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. at 353–54; Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 553; see also In re Vivendi Universal, 
S.A. Sec. Litig., 281 F.R.D. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that American Pipe tolling 
applied to the two-year statute of limitations in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
 126. See generally Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. 538. 
 127. See Crown, 462 U.S. at 354. 
 128. Hall v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 727 F.3d 372, 378 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(finding that vacated certification orders were essentially the same as decertification or 
a denial of certification). 
 129. See In re Direxion Shares ETF Trust, 279 F.R.D. 221, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(citation omitted). 
 130. Monroe Cnty. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. YPF Sociedad Anonima, No. 13 Civ. 842, 
2013 WL 5548833, at * 3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2013) (quoting Sawyer v. Atlas Heating & 
Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 2d 850, 853 (E.D. Wis. 2010)).  But see Direxion 
Shares, 279 F.R.D. at 236 (holding that because voluntarily dismissed claims are 
treated as though they do not exist, they cannot toll the statute of limitations.). 
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limitations.  For example, American Pipe tolling can only be invoked if 
the plaintiff is bringing the same claims as those at issue in the original 
class action.131  Similarly, plaintiffs cannot invoke American Pipe tolling 
if they seek to bring an action against defendants who were not 
defendants in the initial class action. 132   American Pipe tolling is 
generally allowed in cases where an original named plaintiff does not 
have standing.133  However, where the named plaintiff clearly lacked 
standing to the extent that no reasonable class member would have 
relied on the filing of the class action, district courts may refuse to apply 
American Pipe tolling.134 
B. THE TENTH CIRCUIT APPROACH: JOSEPH V. WILES 
In Joseph v. Wiles, the Tenth Circuit was the first United States 
Court of Appeals to consider whether American Pipe tolling applied to 
the three-year statute of repose in Section 13 of the 1933 Act.135  The 
court’s decision distinguished the tolling in American Pipe from 
equitable tolling and held that the three-year statute of repose in Section 
																																																																																																																																
 131. See Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146, 149 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he pendency of a 
previously filed class action does not toll the limitations period for additional class 
actions by putative members of the original asserted class.”). 
 132. Wyser-Pratte Mgmt. Co. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d 553, 568 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that American Pipe tolling of limitation periods against a defendant by class 
action did not apply to a subsequent action against a different defendant, regardless of 
whether the clams arose out of the same or a similar transaction); Champion v. Homa, 
No. 3:03-CV-275-MEF, 2008 WL 8837534, at *11 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 2008) (“The 
American Pipe doctrine is not without limits. First, only those defendants who were 
parties to the original class action can be deemed to have had the requisite notice of the 
claims asserted against them to be subject to the rule.”). 
 133. The Third Circuit has held that American Pipe tolling applies where the 
original named plaintiff in the putative class lacked standing to pursue the claims. See 
McKnowan Lowe & Co. v. Jasmine, Ltd., 295 F.3d 380, 385, 389 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(“[T]he class claims of intervening class members are tolled if a district court declines 
to certify a class for reasons unrelated to the appropriateness of the substantive claims 
for certification.”).  The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Third Circuit’s analysis in 
Griffin v. Singletary. 17 F.3d 356, 360 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 134. In re Morgan Stanley Mortg. Pass-Through Certificates Litig., 810 F.Supp. 2d 
650, 669–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“American Pipe ‘is predicated on the proposition that an 
intervenor that reasonably expected to be represented in the originally filed action’ 
should be able to rely on the representatives to vindicate his rights.”) (quoting Trief v. 
Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 144 F.R.D. 193, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 135. See id. 
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13 tolled during class certification. 136  Sub-section 1 gives a brief 
overview of the facts giving rise to the Tenth Circuit’s decision while 
Sub-section 2 discusses the Tenth Circuit’s rationale for extending 
American Pipe tolling to Section 13’s statute of repose. 
1. Background of the Case 
Joseph concerned the public offering of convertible debentures by 
MiniScribe Corporation, a manufacturer of computer hard disk drives.137 
On May 21, 1987, MiniScribe made over $97 million in the public 
offering.138 Subsequent to the public offering, Mr. Joseph purchased 250 
of the debentures on the secondary market.139  Approximately two years 
later, in March of 1989, MiniScribe announced that prior financial 
statements could not be relied upon due to irregularities in its business 
and accounting practices. 140   In June 1989, Mr. Joseph sold his 
debentures at a loss of $17,000.141  In September 1989, an Independent 
Evaluation Committee report revealed widespread intentional fraud at 
MiniScribe resulting in material overstatements of revenues and 
earnings. 142   By late 1989, MiniScribe filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy.143 
As to be expected, a series of lawsuits ensued.  Notably, on April 5, 
1989, the first suit brought by debenture holders was filed as a class 
action in the District Court of Colorado, asserting claims pursuant to 
Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.144  Several 
other suits followed in various jurisdictions, with two suits of 
importance to Mr. Joseph’s Tenth Circuit appeal.  On May 9, 1989, a 
suit was filed in California state court asserting state law claims as well 
as claims under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 on behalf of all 
MiniScribe securities purchasers, but contained no named plaintiffs who 
had purchased debentures.145  On November 1, 1989 the complaint was 
																																																																																																																																
 136. Id. at 1168. 
 137. Id. at 1157. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 1157, 1158. 
 140. Id. at 1157. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
622 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XIX 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
amended and claims under Section 11 were omitted.146  The second suit 
of import to Mr. Joseph’s claims was filed October 4, 1989. The 
October 4th suit, filed in a Colorado federal district court, asserted 
claims pursuant to Section 10(b) and Section 11 on behalf of common 
stock and debenture purchasers. 147   At a hearing on the motions to 
certify classes of shareholders and debenture purchasers, the district 
court held that it was not prepared to certify a debenture class in the 
instant proceeding and allowed the debenture holders thirty days to file a 
separate amended complaint. 148   Pursuant to the hearing, the district 
court certified a shareholder-only class in a related action in October 
1990.149 
On August 10, 1990, a complaint was filed in California state court 
with Mr. Joseph as a named plaintiff in this action.150  The complaint 
asserted claims pursuant to Section 11 on behalf of all purchasers.151 
Subsequently, the action was removed and transferred to federal district 
court in Colorado, where Mr. Joseph moved to certify the class. 152  
However, on October 24, 1991, the district court denied his motion on 
the grounds that Mr. Joseph lacked standing to pursue a Section 11 
claim as an after market purchaser and, alternatively, that the class 
claims were barred by the statute of repose.153  The shareholder action 
eventually settled in 1993.154  On June 3, 1994, the district court held a 
hearing and ordered that remaining debenture purchasers file their 
claims.155  Accordingly, on July 5, 1994, Mr. Joseph filed an amended 
complaint asserting his Section 10(b) and Section 11 claims. 156  
Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and the district 
court granted the motion finding that the claims were untimely and the 
allegations were insufficient for class certification. 157 
																																																																																																																																
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 1157–58. 
 154. Id. at 1158. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
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Mr. Joseph appealed to the Tenth Circuit.158  Most pertinent to this 
Note was Mr. Joseph’s argument that his claims were timely because the 
applicable limitations periods should toll while class certification was 
pending.159 
2.  The Tenth Circuit’s Rationale 
The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district 
court’s order and decision with respect to Mr. Joseph’s claims.160  The 
issue of importance to this Note is the Tenth Circuit’s ruling with 
regards to Mr. Joseph’s third argument: whether the statute of repose 
tolls during class certification for claims filed pursuant to Section 11. 
Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit held that Mr. Joseph’s Section 11 
claim was timely because the applicable statute of repose in Section 13 
of the 1933 Act tolls during class certification.161  Defendants argued 
that precedent barred the court from applying equitable tolling principles 
to the statute of repose. 162   However, the Tenth Circuit found their 
arguments unavailing and distinguished equitable tolling from legal 
tolling.163  While the Supreme Court has held that the statute of repose is 
not subject to equitable tolling,164 the Court has not ruled as to whether 
or not statutes of repose are subject to legal tolling.165  The Tenth Circuit 
held that the tolling rule in American Pipe was a rule of legal tolling, not 
equitable tolling, which allowed the court to apply American Pipe 
tolling to the statute of repose in Section 13.166 
																																																																																																																																
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 1169. 
 161. Id. at 1168. 
 162. Id. at 1166.  The defendants cited Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. 
Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 363 (1991), and Anixter v. Home-Stake Production Co., 939 
F.2d 1420, 1434–35 (10th Cir. 1991). 
 163. For example, equitable tolling is appropriate where “the claimant has filed a 
defective pleading during the statutory period . . . or where the plaintiff has been 
induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to 
pass.” Joseph, 223 F.3d at 1166–68.  On the other hand, “tolling that occurs any time an 
action is commenced and class certification is pending” is legal tolling. Id. 
 164. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 363. 
 165. Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of City of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 95, 
100 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 166. Joseph, 223 F.3d at 1166–68. 
624 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XIX 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
In reaching this decision, the Tenth Circuit relied heavily on the 
American Pipe Court’s emphasis on Rule 23.167  The court held that 
tolling the statute of repose while a class is awaiting certification serves 
Rule 23’s interests in judicial economy by eliminating the need for 
potential class members to file individual claims to secure their 
interests.168  Furthermore, defendants were not unfairly prejudiced by 
applying American Pipe tolling to the statute of repose since the 
previous class actions put them on notice as to the substantive claims 
and the general number and identities of the parties that brought them.169 
Although the Tenth Circuit was the first circuit court to apply 
American Pipe tolling to statutes of repose, district courts in other 
circuits have heavily relied on Joseph to support applying American 
Pipe tolling in the same context.  In 2007, the Eastern District of 
Wisconsin adopted the Joseph rationale and held that American Pipe 
tolling applies to the three-year statute of repose in the Truth in Lending 
Act.170  Two years later, in 2009, the First Circuit applied American Pipe 
tolling to the statue of repose in an employee benefits case.171  In 2012, 
the District of New Jersey agreed with the Tenth Circuit’s holding in 
Joseph and tolled the three-year statute of repose for Section 10(b) 
claims.172  Each of these courts adopted the Joseph Court’s distinction 
between equitable tolling and legal tolling and held that American Pipe 
tolling was legal tolling.173 
																																																																																																																																
 167. Id. at 1167. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 1167–68. 
 170. Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, 243 F.R.D. 313, 316–17 (E.D. Wis. 2007) 
(holding that the filing of a class action tolls the statute of repose, serves the purposes of 
Rule 23, and does not compromise the purposes of the three-year statute of repose 
because defendants were on notice of the nature of the claim and the identity of 
plaintiffs). 
 171. Arivella v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 623 F.Supp. 2d 164, 177 (D. Mass 2009) 
(holding that statutes of repose are meant to demarcate a set time frame in which a 
plaintiff must place a defendant on notice and that American Pipe tolling “accomplishes 
the exact same goal, rendering the statute of repose superfluous for the period of time 
that the class action is pending”). 
 172. In re Merek & Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 180707, at *44 (D.N.J. Dec. 20, 
2012). 
 173. See id. at *41–42; Andrews, 243 F.R.D. at 316–17; Arivella, 623 F.Supp. 2d at 
177 (“The differences between the forms of tolling is crucial because the animating 
principles of legal tolling are compatible with tolling a statute of repose, while the 
reasoning behind equitable tolling is not.”). 
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C.  THE SECOND CIRCUIT APPROACH:  POLICE AND FIRE RETIREMENT 
SYSTEM OF THE CITY OF DETROIT ET AL. V. INDYMAC MBS, INC. 
In contrast to the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Joseph, this past 
summer, the Second Circuit held that American Pipe tolling could not 
apply to the three-year statute of repose in Section 13.174  In IndyMac 
MBS, Inc., the lead plaintiff and putative class members brought claims 
pursuant to Sections 11, 12(a), and 15 of the 1933 Act.175  Allegedly, the 
defendants made fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions in over 
100 various offerings regarding the sale of certain mortgage pass-
through certificates under the related registration statements and 
prospectus.176 
1. Background of the Case 
Two separate class action lawsuits were brought against defendants 
in district court, one by the City of Detroit Police and Fire Retirement 
System (“Detroit PFRS”) and one by the Wyoming State Treasurer and 
the Wyoming Retirement System (jointly, “Wyoming”).177  The actions 
were consolidated and Wyoming was appointed the lead plaintiff 
pursuant to PSLRA.178  On June 21, 2010, the district court dismissed all 
claims arising from offerings of securities that were not purchased by 
Wyoming for lack of standing by the named Plaintiffs.179  Subsequently, 
Detroit PFRS and other putative members of the class moved to 
intervene in the action to assert their claims with respect to the 
certificates not purchased by Wyoming.180  Even though the three-year 
statute of repose had run its course, the intervenors argued that 
American Pipe tolling should apply.181  In the event that American Pipe 
tolling could not be invoked, the intervenors sought to have their claims 
“relate back” to the initial action.182 
																																																																																																																																
 174. Police and Fire Ret. Sys. of the City of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 
95, 101 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 175. Id. at 101–02. 
 176. See id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 102. 
 179. Id. at 103. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
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The district court denied both motions, holding that American Pipe 
tolling did not apply to the statute of repose and that relation back 
pursuant to Rule 15(c) could not be employed to extend the statute of 
repose.183  Three of the five intervenors appealed to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit arguing that American Pipe 
tolling should toll the applicable statute of repose. 184 
2. The Second Circuit’s Rationale 
The Second Circuit refused to extend American Pipe tolling to 
Section 13’s statute of repose noting that only the legislature can create 
an exception to a statute of repose. 185   The Second Circuit did not 
characterize the tolling in American Pipe as equitable or legal as other 
courts had when faced with the issue of applying the doctrine to statutes 
of repose.186  The court saw no need to do so.  If the tolling sanctioned in 
American Pipe was a form of equitable tolling, then it could not apply to 
statutes of repose.187  The Second Circuit determined that statutes of 
repose created a substantive right in defendants to be free of liability 
after the time period Congress prescribed had passed.188  Since the Rules 
Enabling Act dictates that general rules of practice and procedure “shall 
not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,”189  the Second 
Circuit held that the tolling in American Pipe, largely based on the 
																																																																																																																																
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 104. 
 185. Id. at 106 (citing P. Stolz Family P’ship v. Daum, 355 F.3d 92, 102 (2d Cir. 
2004)). 
 186. Id. at 107–09. 
 187. Id. at 109 (citing Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 
U.S. 350, 363 (1991)). 
 188. Id. at 106 (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Newton Sheep Co., 85 F.3d 1464, 1472 
(10th Cir. 1996). 
 189.  
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general 
rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the 
United States district courts . . . and courts of appeals. 
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force 
or effect after such rules have taken effect. 
Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §2072(a)–(b) (2012). 
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judicial efficiency interests in Rule 23, could not extend to statutes of 
repose, even if classified as legal tolling.190 
Prior to the Second Circuit decision in IndyMac, other courts 
refused to apply American Pipe tolling to the statute of repose, but relied 
on a different rationale. One federal judge for the Southern District of 
New York adopted a statutory interpretation approach and held that 
American Pipe tolling could not be extended to Section 13’s statute of 
repose because doing so would violate the plain language of Section 
13.191  Another federal judge for the Southern District of New York also 
previously held that American Pipe tolling was a form of equitable 
tolling and thus inapplicable to the statute of repose.192 
D. THE AFTERMATH 
Currently, the Tenth and Second Circuits are the only United States 
Courts of Appeals to rule as to whether or not American Pipe tolling 
applies to the statute of repose. 193   Each circuit court highlighted 
important policies in handing down their decisions.194  After weighing 
Rule 23’s interest in judicial economy against a defendant’s interest in 
fair notice of the claims brought against him and the generic number and 
identities of the individuals bringing them, the Tenth Circuit held that 
the statute of repose is tolled during class certification.195  By extending 
American Pipe tolling to statutes of repose, the Joseph ruling increases a 
plaintiff’s opportunities to adjudicate their securities fraud claims.196  
Resolving securities fraud claims on their merits—rather than 
dismissing them on procedural grounds—furthers enforcement of the 
securities laws and has a greater deterrent effect on violators.197  On the 
																																																																																																																																
 190. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d at 108. 
 191. Footbridge Ltd. Trust v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 770 F. Supp. 2d 618, 623 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“By the plain language of section 13, the three-year statute of repose 
is absolute . . . . Simply put the words “[i]n no event” mean what they say.”) (citing 
Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1391 (7th Cir. 1990)); In re Lehman 
Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 800 F. Supp 2d 477, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 192. Plumbers, Pipefitters & MES Local Union 392 v. Fairfax Fin. Holdings, Ltd., 
886 F. Supp. 2d 328, 333–35 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 193. IndyMac Investor Asks Supreme Court to Review Tolling of Statute of Repose, 
20 No. 4 WESTLAW J. DERIVATIVES 7 at *2 (Jan. 17, 2014). 
 194. Cf. Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1157 (10th Cir. 2000); IndyMac MBS, Inc., 
721 F.3d 95. 
 195. Joseph, 223 F.3d at 1169. 
 196. Id. at 1166 (citing Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968)). 
 197. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 3, at 1608. 
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other hand, the Second Circuit weighed a defendant’s substantive right 
of repose against the Rule 23’s interests in judicial economy and 
refrained from tolling the statute of repose during class certification.198  
Refraining from tolling statutes of repose protects defendants from the 
prospect of perpetual liability. 199   By enforcing statute of repose in 
Section 13 as a cutoff, the IndyMac ruling may even prevent excessive 
securities fraud litigation costs from being passed on to shareholders.200 
III. AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION REJECTING PROCESS OVER SUBSTANCE 
March 10, 2014, the Supreme Court granted the IndyMac MBS 
investors’ petition for a writ of certiorari.201  Taking into consideration 
the canons of statutory construction and issues of the separation of 
powers, Section A of this Part discusses why courts should refrain from 
extending American Pipe tolling to statutes of repose.  Section B will 
propose a legislative exception to the statute of repose for class actions 
that satisfy the statute of limitations so that viable claims are not 
precluded on procedural grounds.  Section C demonstrates that state 
courts have also refrained from tolling statutes of repose and that state 
legislatures have created legislative exceptions to statutes of repose in 
cases involving fraud. 
A. COURTS SHOULD NOT APPLY AMERICAN PIPE TOLLING TO THE 
STATUTES OF REPOSE IN SECTION 13 AND SECTION 804 
Although the Tenth Circuit sought to enforce the judicial economy 
concerns in American Pipe, the court should not have tolled the statute 
of repose.202  Inconvenience or hardship cannot justify a departure from 
																																																																																																																																
 198. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d at 108. 
 199. See Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir. 1987), overruled on other 
grounds. See generally Spence v. Miles Labs., Inc., 810 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. Tenn. 
1992). 
 200. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 3 at 1605–06 (“[S]cholars suggest that 
the costs of securities class actions-both the settlement and the litigation expenses of 
both sides-fall largely on the defendant corporation, and so its shareholders ultimately 
bear these costs indirectly.”). 
 201. Public Empees.’ Ret. Sys. v. IndyMac MBS, Inc.,134 S. Ct. 1515 (2014). 
 202. Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 63 (1902) (“[W]hat shall be considered a 
reasonable time [to bring claims] must be settled by the judgment of the legislature, and 
the courts will not inquire into the wisdom of its decision in establishing the period of 
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the plain language of the statute. 203   Thus, determining whether 
American Pipe tolling is legal or equitable, or whether a defendant has a 
substantive right to repose, is unnecessary.  Courts should simply rely 
on the plain language of the statute.  This Note advocates that courts 
adopt a statutory interpretation approach and find that American Pipe 
tolling cannot apply to the statute of repose.  Sub-sections 1 and 2 
demonstrate that utilizing the tools of statutory interpretation preclude 
courts from tolling the statutes of repose in securities fraud claims.  Sub-
section 1 analyzes the plain language of Section 13 of the 1933 Act and 
804 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act.  Sub-section 2 employs the principle of 
statutory construction that prohibits interpreting statutes in a way that 
makes part of the statute superfluous or void.  Sub-section 3 shows that, 
aside from adhering to the correct statutory interpretation of Sections 13 
and 804, courts should not toll the statutes of repose in securities fraud 
class actions because the legislature intended for them to be a firm 
deadline. 
1. The Plain Language of Section 13 and Section 804 Precludes Courts 
from Tolling the Statutes of Repose for Securities Fraud Class Actions 
The first step in statutory interpretation is to look to the language of 
the statute and determine whether the language at issue has a plain and 
unambiguous meaning. 204   The language of the statute of repose in 
Section 13 of the 1933 Act is clear.  “In no event shall any such action 
be brought to enforce a liability created under Section 11 or Section 
12(a)(1) . . . more than three years after the security was bona fide 
offered to the public.”205  The language in Section 804 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 is equally clear.206  The judiciary is not at liberty to 
create an exception to an unambiguous legislative decree.207  To do so 
																																																																																																																																
legal bar, unless the time allowed is manifestly so insufficient that the statute becomes a 
denial of justice.”). 
 203. Amy v. Watertown, 130 U.S. 320, 324 (1889) (noting that the general rule is 
the judiciary could not create an additional exception to the applicable statute of 
limitations that was not among those already articulated in the statute). 
 204. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (citing Robinson v. 
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)). 
 205. 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 206. Id. (“[M]ay be brought no later than . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 207. Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of City of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 95, 
106 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[A] statute of repose is subject only to legislatively created 
exceptions.”) (citing P. Stolz Family P’ship L.P. v. Daum, 355 F.3d 92, 102 (2d Cir. 
2004)). 
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would be judicial legislation.208  Courts are only granted the authority to 
interpret legislative decrees and determine their constitutionality; they 
cannot modify them at their discretion.209  The words “[i]n no event” in 
Section 13 mean just that.210  Since the language of Section 13 and 
Section 804 is clear and unambiguous, judicial inquiry as to whether the 
statute of repose can be tolled should end here.211 
2. Tolling the Statutes of Repose in Securities Fraud Class Actions 
Would Contravene Principles of Statutory Construction 
Statutes should be interpreted so that so that each clause, sentence, 
or word is meaningful.212  Applying American Pipe tolling to statutes of 
repose would render the phrases “in no event”, in Section 13, and “not 
later than”, in Section 804, void and insignificant.  Furthermore, since 
the one-year/two-year period is subject to equitable tolling principles, 
any interpretation that does not consider the three-year period, in 
Section 13, and the five-year period, in Section 804, an absolute 
																																																																																																																																
 208. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 307–08 (1993) (“Adherence to 
these restraints on judicial review preserves to the legislative branch its rightful 
independence and its ability to function. The restraints have added force where a 
legislature must engage in a process of line drawing . . .”); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 
78, 85 (1987) (“Separation of powers concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint.”); 
see also Morgan v. Des Moines, 60 F. 208, 209 (8th Cir. 1894) (holding that the 
judiciary could not import an exception to the statute of limitations that Congress did 
not intend; “[t]o do so would be judicial legislation . . .”). 
 209. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (“Our individual 
appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by the 
Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the meaning of 
an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process 
comes to an end.”). 
 210. Footbridge Ltd. Trust v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 770 F. Supp. 2d 618, 624 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F. 2d 1385, 1391 (7th 
Cir. 1990)). 
 211. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (citing Robinson v. 
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)). 
 212. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (stating that it is a “cardinal 
principle of statutory construction” that a statute should be interpreted so that “no 
clause, sentence, or word [is] superfluous, void, or insignificant.”) (quoting Duncan v. 
Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (internal quotations omitted)). 
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limitation would make the language outlining those limitation periods 
superfluous.213 
3. Inquiry into the Legislative Intent Precludes Court from Tolling 
Statutes of Repose in Securities Fraud Class Actions 
In the event a statute’s language is ambiguous, the inquiry turns to 
the congressional intent.214 To determine congressional intent, the court 
must look to the policies underlying the limitation periods. 215   The 
language of Section 13 and Section 804 is clear and unambiguous.216 
However, it is apparent Congress intended for the statutes of repose to 
completely extinguish a plaintiff’s claim.217  The Tenth Circuit erred 
when it examined the purpose of Rule 23 to determine if tolling should 
be permitted rather than Congress’ purpose for creating the three-year 
statute of repose.218  The Second Circuit correctly found that Congress 
intended the three-year period in Section 13 to be an absolute 
limitation.219  Senate and House conference reports reveal Congress was 
dissatisfied with the limitations periods in Section 13, but was wary of 
																																																																																																																																
 213. Summer v. Land & Leisure, Inc., 664 F.2d 965, 968 (5th Cir. 1981) ( 
“Otherwise [Section 13] would create a limitation period for all suits of one year from 
the time discovery of the untrue statements or omissions should have been made, and 
the three year provision would serve no purpose at all.”) (internal quotation omitted). 
 214. See United States v. Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d 1234, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 215. Burnett v. N.Y.C. Ry. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 427 (1965). 
 216. Footbridge Ltd. Trust v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 770 F. Supp. 2d 618, 624, 
627 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1391 
(7th Cir. 1990)). 
 217. S. REP. NO. 107–146, at 24 (2002); 148 Cong. Rec. H5462-02 (daily ed. July 
25, 2002) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee); 148 Cong. Rec. S7350-04 (daily ed. July 
25, 2002) (statement of Sen. Gramm). 
 218. Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of City of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 95, 
107 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he Supreme Court in Lampf noted that Section 13’s three-year 
limitation is a period of repose inconsistent with tolling and reiterated that the purpose 
of the 3-year limitation is clearly to serve as a cutoff.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 219. Id.; see Maxwell v. LaBrunerie, 731 F. Supp. 358, 361 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (citing 
Admiralty Fund v. Hugh Johnson & Co., 677 F.2d 1301, 1308 (9th Cir. 1982)); 
Armbrister v. Roland Int’l Corp., 667 F. Supp. 802, 823 (M.D. Fla. 1987); Antinore v. 
Alexander & Alexander Servs., 597 F. Supp. 1353, 1356 (D. Minn. 1984) (citing Engl 
v. Berg, 511 F. Supp. 1146, 1150 (E.D. Pa. 1981) and Turner v. First Wis. Mortg. Trust, 
454 F. Supp. 899, 911 (E.D. Wis. 1978)); Brick v. Dominion Mortg. & Realty Trust, 
442 F. Supp. 283, 289–91 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); Cowsar v. Reg’l Recreation, Inc., 65 
F.D.R. 394, 397 (M.D. La. 1974). 
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the potential for abusive litigation.220  The Senate explicitly noted that 
the five-year statute of repose in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act should not be 
subject to equitable tolling. 221  Prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
extension, Congress failed to extend the statute of limitations when 
passing PLSRA and SLUSA despite a noted dissatisfaction with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Lampf v. Gilbertson to create the current 
one-year limitations and three-year repose periods for securities fraud 
claims.222 Congress’s reluctance to alter the limitations periods in place 
prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley extension, coupled with the concern for 
abusive litigation, evinces the legislature’s interest in creating an 
absolute bar to untimely claims rather than allowing all viable claims to 
be adjudicated.223 
B. CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND THE SECURITIES ACTS TO CREATE AN 
EXCEPTION TO THE STATUTES OF REPOSE IN SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS 
ACTIONS 
This Note calls for congressional action to rectify the procedural 
impediments plaintiffs face when opting to bring their securities fraud 
claims in a class action.  Congress should create an exception to the 
statutes of repose in Section 13 of the 1933 Act and Section 804 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act to permit American Pipe tolling while a class 
awaits certification.  Sub-section 1 gives an example of a current 
legislative exception to a statute of repose while Sub-section 2 explains 
why an exception to the statute of repose is the most effective option for 
remedying procedural impediments to securities fraud class actions. 
																																																																																																																																
 220. See 148 Cong. Rec. H5462-02 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Rep. 
Jackson-Lee) and 148 Cong. Rec. S7350-04 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Sen. 
Gramm). 
 221. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 24 (2002). 
 222. S. REP. No. 105-182 16–17, 19 (1998) (noting that the PSLRA’s failure to 
extend the statute of limitations applicable to securities fraud cases was one of its 
shortcomings). 
 223. See S. REP. No. 105-182 at 16–17, 19 (1998); see also 148 Cong. Rec. H5462-
02 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee); 148 Cong. Rec. S7350-04 
(daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Sen. Gramm). 
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1. The Statute of Repose Exception in GARA 
In the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (“GARA”),224 
Congress provided for four exceptions to GARA’s 18-year statute of 
repose: the fraud exception, the medical emergency exception, the not 
aboard the aircraft exception, and the written warranty exception.225  In 
practice, the fraud exception is GARA’s most litigated exception.226  
While objectors argue that GARA and the Securities Acts are not 
analogous, Congress enacted both with policies geared towards 
protecting public consumers. 227   GARA seeks to protect the public 
interests by regulating small commercial airlines, 228  while Congress 
implemented the securities acts to offer shareholders greater protections 
in the pre-reform securities market.229 
2. A Statutory Exception is the Most Efficient Solution to Overcoming 
Procedural Obstacles to Viable Claims 
Statutory exceptions to statutes of repose allow plaintiffs greater 
opportunities to adjudicate their claims.  Thus, a statutory exception to 
the statute of repose for securities fraud cases would further the purpose 
of the Securities Acts and shareholder protection through regulation and 
agency oversight.  An exception similar to the GARA misrepresentation 
exception would not prejudice defendants with the unfair surprises 
																																																																																																																																
 224. General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 
1552. 
 225. See id.; see also Franklin F. Bass & Robert Modica, The General Aviation 
Revitalization Act: A BriefOoverview, WILSON ELSER (2006), available at 
http://www.wilsonelser.com/files/repository/GARA_April2006.pdf. 
 226. See Bass & Modica, supra note 226. 
 227. See General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-298, 108 Stat. 
1552; see also Securities Act of 1933 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a) (2012). 
 228.  
The Secretary of Transportation must consider factors such as the 
public interests in: 
(4) the availability of a variety of adequate, economic, efficient, and low-priced services 
without unreasonable discrimination or unfair or deceptive practices . . . (7) developing 
and maintaining a sound regulatory system that is responsive to the needs of the public 
. . . (9) preventing unfair, deceptive, predatory, or anticompetitive practices in air 
transportation . . . 
General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C. § 40101(2012). 
 229. See FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW, supra note 9, at 1; Aguilar, supra note 10. 
634 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XIX 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
statutes of repose aim to avoid. 230  Prior class actions dismissed on 
procedural grounds put defendants on notice as to the number and 
generic identities of possible plaintiffs and the claims they are likely to 
bring.231 Since plaintiffs must still satisfy the one/two year statutes of 
limitations, a class action exception to the statute of repose would not 
give plaintiffs free reign to pursue stale claims and expose defendants to 
perpetual liability.232 
While others may advocate an extension of the statutes of repose, 
such a compromise would not suffice. Admittedly, an extension would 
likely allow more individuals to bring claims after class certification is 
denied.  However, it would not extend the same opportunity to all 
shareholders that creating a statutory class action exception would.  A 
congressional amendment allowing an exception to the statutes of 
repose for class action securities fraud claims would provide a bright-
line rule for district courts and courts of appeals satisfying a defendant’s 
interest in fair and timely notice and a plaintiff’s interest in a fair 
opportunity to vindicate his rights. 
C. STATE COURT AND LEGISLATIVE EXAMPLES 
Although securities fraud claims are within the jurisdiction of 
federal courts, a look at state court decisions indicates that state courts 
have routinely refused to toll statutes of repose.  To avoid viable claims 
																																																																																																																																
 230. GARA’s fraud exception to its 18-year statute of repose allows claimants who 
plead: 
with specificity the facts necessary to prove, and proves, that the 
manufacturer with respect to a type certificate or airworthiness 
certificate for, or obligations with respect to continuing 
airworthiness of, an aircraft or a component, system, subassembly, 
or other part of an aircraft knowingly misrepresented to the Federal 
Aviation Administration, or concealed or withheld from the Federal 
Aviation Administration, required information that is material and 
relevant to the performance or the maintenance or operation of such 
aircraft, or the component, system, subassembly, or other part, that is  
causally related to the harm which the claimant allegedly suffered . . 
. . 
49 U.S.C. § 40101. 
 231. Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1168 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 232. See Am. Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 555 (1974). 
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from being precluded on procedural grounds, state legislatures have 
carved out exceptions to statutes of repose, especially in claims 
involving fraudulent behavior by defendants.  Sub-section 1 of this 
Section outlines state cases where the court refused to toll the statute of 
repose.  Sub-section 2 gives examples of various state legislative 
exceptions to statutes of repose. 
1. State Courts Refuse to Toll Statutes of Repose 
State supreme courts refuse to toll statutes of repose, even in cases 
where defendants have committed fraud.  In Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. 
Partnership, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that filing a motion for 
class certification in securities fraud claims does not toll the statute of 
repose for individual class members. 233   State courts also typically 
refrain from tolling statutes of repose in fields outside of securities 
regulation.  For example, Arkansas has refrained from applying the 
state’s “repair” tolling doctrine to the five-year statute of repose for 
claims arising from defective construction, even in cases where the 
defendant fraudulently concealed the defective construction. 234   In 
declining to toll statutes of repose, the states have recognized that the 
judiciary’s duty is to apply the law as it is, and not as they believe it 
should be.235 
2. State Legislatures Provide Exceptions to Statutes of Repose in Claims 
																																																																																																																																
 233. Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. P’ship, 254 P.3d 360 (D. Ariz. 2011).  Initially, the 
United States District Court for the District of Arizona held that Arizona’s statute of 
repose barred the plaintiff’s claim. Id.  The plaintiff appealed and the Ninth Circuit 
certified the question to the Supreme Court of Arizona. Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. 
P’ship, 634 F.3d 524 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 234. First Electric Coop. Corp. v. Black, Corley, Owens & Hughs, P.A., 2011 Ark. 
App. 447, at *4 (Ct. App. 2011) (“[O]ur supreme court has identified the five-year-
limitations period in section 16-56-112(a) as a statute of repose. A statute of repose . . . 
is an absolute time limit beyond which liability no longer exists and is not tolled for any 
reason. . .”) (internal citations omitted)). 
 235. See id. at *4–5 (“[The] supreme court has consistently refused to graft 
judicially created exceptions onto the statute of repose . . . we are hesitant to impose on 
[the statute of repose] any construction not warranted by its own clear terms.”); 
Rosenberg v. Falling Water, Inc., 709 S.E.2d 227 (Ga. 2011) (affirming the lower 
court’s decision to grant summary judgment and holding that the statute of repose 
cannot be tolled, even in cases where plaintiffs allege the defendant fraudulently 
concealed a defect in the construction of their patio and the plaintiff was injured after 
the statute of repose had passed). 
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Involving Fraud 
States legislatures have also sought to remedy the harsh results of 
statutes of repose in fraud cases by carving out statutory exemptions to 
statutes of repose for specific claims, such as claims of fraud, intentional 
misrepresentation, or gross negligence.236  In Tennessee, for example, 
the legislature created an exception to the statute of repose for health 
care liability actions.237  The statute of repose can toll in actions where 
the statute of limitations has been satisfied and the defendant 
fraudulently concealed his violation. 238   Similarly, the Minnesota 
legislature has provided an exception to the ten-year statute of repose for 
injury claims arising from construction services when fraud is 
involved.239  In Arizona, the legislature included an exception to the 
twelve-year statute of repose in product liability cases where the cause 
of action is based on the manufacturer or seller’s negligence or a breach 
of express warranty. 240   Mississippi’s legislature adopted a broad 
exception to limitation periods in cases where the defendant fraudulently 
concealed the cause of action.241 Since most state statutory exceptions 
require fraudulent action or concealment by defendants, state exceptions 
																																																																																																																																
 236. See Alan R. Levy, Buckley & Curtis, Limited Respite is Found in Statutes of 
Repose, in FOR THE DEFENSE (2010), available at 
http://buckleyandcurtis.com/articles/levy-articles/dri-repose-article.pdf. 
 237. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-116(a)(3) (2014). 
 238. Id. 
 239. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.051 (2014). 
 240. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §12-551 (2014).  Similarly, Colorado has a legislative 
exception for products liability claims where injuries were caused by hidden defects or 
prolonged exposure to hazardous materials, or if the manufacturer, seller, or lessor 
intentionally misrepresented or fraudulently concealed material facts regarding the 
product that proximately caused the injury. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-107 
(2014). 
 241.  
If a person liable to any personal action shall fraudulently conceal 
the cause of action from the knowledge of the person entitled 
thereto, the cause of action shall be deemed to have first accrued at, 
and not before, the time at which such fraud shall be, or with 
reasonable diligence might have been, first known or discovered. 
MISS. CODE ANN. §15-1-67 (2014).  The Mississippi statute has been held to extend to 
statutes of repose. See Windham v. Latco of Miss., Inc., 972 So. 2d 608, 613–14 (Miss. 
2008). 
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to statutes of repose evince a concern for inequitable results that allow 
defendants to escape liability while injured plaintiffs are left with no 
legal recourse.242 
CONCLUSION 
While the statute of repose for securities fraud claims precludes 
meritorious class action claims from adjudication, the judiciary should 
not be the branch to create an exception for securities class actions.  The 
plain language of Section 13 and Section 804’s statutes of repose is clear 
and Congress’s intent is apparent: the judiciary cannot exercise its 
discretion to toll the statute of repose during class certification. 243  
Therefore, this Note encourages Congress to amend the 1933 Act and 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and create an exception to the statutes of repose 
for securities fraud class actions allowing American Pipe tolling in cases 
where the initial class action was filed within the statute of 
limitations.244  Such an exception would satisfy a defendant’s right to 
fair notice of the plaintiffs and their claims and their interest in avoiding 
perpetual liability while protecting a plaintiff’s right to pursue legal 
recourse in a timely manner.245 
 
																																																																																																																																
 242. See Windham, 972 So. 2d 608. 
 243. See Footbridge Ltd. Trust v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 770 F. Supp. 2d 618, 624, 
627 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1391 
(7th Cir. 1990)); see also Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of City of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, 
Inc., 721 F.3d 95, 107 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 244. See supra Part III.B. 
 245. See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554–55 (1974). 
